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THE ROBERTS COURT VS. THE REGULATORS: SURVEYING 
ARBITRATION’S NEXT BATTLEGROUND 
Paul F. Kirgis* 
Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has taken a series of 
steps having the design or effect of restricting access to judicial process. 
This “disadjudication” project has proceeded along three tracks: 1) with 
respect to its own docket, the Court has dramatically reduced the number of 
cases it decides each year; 2) in the criminal area, the Court has cut way 
back on access to the federal courts through habeas corpus; and 3) in the 
civil area, the Court has simultaneously erected barriers to litigation by 
heightening pleading standards and expanded the scope of arbitration to 
suck more and more claims out of courts at both the federal and state levels. 
For the Rehnquist Court, the disadjudication project at times seemed 
motivated primarily by a desire to clear judicial dockets. The Roberts Court 
appears to have a more ambitious agenda, particularly when it comes to 
arbitration. It has almost always sided with the Chamber of Commerce in 
business cases, and the Chamber wants its members to have control over the 
processes used to ensure that they comply with the law. The Court has 
enthusiastically complied. Through a string of decisions, most recently 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011)(upholding 
arbitration of claims under Credit Repair Organizations Act) and AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)(upholding class waiver in 
arbitration agreement), the Court has encouraged companies to push their 
consumers and employees into arbitration, placing the enforcement of both 
federal and state laws in private hands and allowing companies to opt out of 
class actions entirely in many contexts. 
With the states and the lower federal courts unable to limit the scope 
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements or preserve class actions, the next 
arbitration battleground will pit the Supreme Court’s conservative majority 
against federal agencies staffed by Democratic appointees seeking to use 
regulation to slow the arbitration juggernaut. Two recent agency decisions 
and a new court ruling upholding a third have placed the agencies squarely 
in opposition to the Court on the permissible scope of arbitration 
agreements and the effect of class waivers. These agencies are, in effect, 
telling the courts to reopen the doors and start hearing cases. The result is a 
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through-the-looking-glass moment in which agencies defend rights to court 
adjudication against incursions by the Supreme Court. 
The NLRB and Collective Action under the Labor Laws 
In D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, the National Labor 
Relations Board ruled that an employer may not compel its employees—
whether unionized or not—to waive their rights to enforce the labor laws 
through collective legal action. D.R. Horton had included an arbitration 
agreement with a class waiver in its employment contracts, ostensibly 
precluding employees from maintaining either class actions or class 
arbitrations in the pursuit of employment-related claims. Cuda tried to 
initiate a class arbitration claiming violations of the wage and hour 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and lodged an unfair labor 
practice charge when D.R. Horton refused to arbitrate. 
The NLRB based its decision on its construction of NLRA Section 
7, which guarantees employees the right to engage in collective action to 
enforce labor laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. The NLRB 
equated class action litigation and class action arbitration to other forms of 
concerted labor activity, such as the pursuit of collective grievances within 
a collective bargaining relationship and strikes. It further interpreted the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act to “protect[] concerted employment-related litigation 
by employees against federal judicial restraint based upon agreements 
between employees and their employer.” It then concluded that “an 
arbitration agreement imposed upon individual employees as a condition of 
employment cannot be held to prohibit employees from pursuing an 
employment-related class, collective, or joint action in a Federal or State 
court.” 
Significantly, the NLRB did not reproach D.R. Horton for pushing 
its employees into arbitration—it focused only on the provision in the 
employment agreement prohibiting collective action, whether through 
arbitration or litigation. It invalidated the provision to the extent it 
prohibited class action litigation without allowing class arbitration in its 
place, on the grounds that the labor laws guarantee collective action of some 
kind in their enforcement.  
FINRA and Class Action Waivers under the Securities Laws 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, is a private 
self-regulatory organization that regulates the securities industry under 
delegation from Congress through the Securities Exchange Commission. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 78s. FINRA’s Rules are approved by the SEC pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and have the force and effect of federal 
ARBITRATION’S	  NEXT	  BATTLEGROUND	  
	   3	  
regulation. Since the Supreme Court blessed arbitration of disputes under 
the1934 Act in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 
(1987), virtually all securities disputes involving broker-dealers and their 
customers have been arbitrated; FINRA oversees those arbitrations.  
FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3) prohibits member firms from including 
“any condition” in their arbitration agreements that “limits the ability of a 
party to file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules 
of the forums in which a claim may be filed under any agreement.” FINRA 
and its predecessors have long interpreted this provision in Code of 
Arbitration Procedure Rule 12204 to prohibit broker-dealers from enforcing 
arbitration agreements with respect to claims that are the subject of a 
certified or putative class action. Both of these rules have been approved by 
the SEC. Thus, under rules promulgated by FINRA and approved by the 
SEC, customers must be permitted to bring class actions in court and must 
not be forced to arbitrate claims that are the subject of class litigation.  
Following Concepcion, Charles Schwab began inserting a class 
action waiver into its arbitration agreements with customers. FINRA 
commenced an internal disciplinary action against Schwab for violating 
FINRA rules. In turn, Schwab filed a declaratory judgment action in the 
Northern District of California arguing that FINRA’s interpretation of Rule 
2268(d)(3) to bar class action waivers is impermissible in light of 
Concepcion and CompuCredit. Schwab argues that Concepcion “establishes 
that the federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
also favors the enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements” and that CompuCredit “establishes that the FAA’s policy 
directive controls over other federal laws absent a clear contrary 
Congressional command.” See Schwab Complaint ¶ 39. 
Arbitration Policy Meets Agency Action: Chevron Deference 
These cases present a stark choice: the agencies’ determinations that 
the labor laws and securities laws guarantee rights to collective action on 
the one hand, and Supreme Court precedents validating adhesion contracts 
that strip the right to collective action by way of arbitration on the other. As 
challenges to these agency actions wend their way through the courts, they 
will likely pit the “federal policy favoring arbitration” that the Supreme 
Court has divined from the Federal Arbitration Act against the principle of 
deference to agency decision-making enshrined in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
Chevron requires courts to engage in a two-step analysis of agency 
decisionmaking. In the first step, the court asks whether Congress has 
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“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If the court finds that the 
statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court 
must ask whether the agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” In practice, the Chevron analysis has been 
understood to require judicial deference to any reasonable construction of 
statutory language by an agency delegated rulemaking authority. 
There is little doubt that the NLRB has been delegated rulemaking 
authority under the labor laws and that the SEC, acting through FINRA, has 
been delegated rulemaking authority under the securities laws. There is also 
little doubt that the statutes at issue do not speak directly to the question of 
arbitral class waivers. The agencies are thus entitled to deference in their 
interpretations of those statutes. In these cases, however, giving deference 
would mean contradicting Supreme Court pronouncements about the effect 
of the FAA. To date, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed an 
agency’s ruling limiting arbitration, so it has not considered the role of 
Chevron deference under those circumstances. But the Court may soon face 
a version of that issue as a result of a circuit split over a Federal Trade 
Commission rule interpreting the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  
The FTC and Arbitration Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act 
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is the federal law that governs 
warranties on consumer products. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2011). The 
FTC is the federal agency tasked with interpreting and enforcing the 
MMWA. The FTC has adopted a regulation stating that informal dispute 
settlement procedures under the MMWA cannot be legally binding on any 
person. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j). The agency interprets this regulation to 
preclude the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements with respect 
to warranty claims. 
In Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit relied on this regulation to refuse enforcement 
of a mandatory arbitration agreement in a used car sales contract. Applying 
Chevron, the court first found that the MMWA does not specifically address 
binding arbitration. The court then found the FTC’s interpretation 
reasonable, because the agency had attempted to determine Congress’s 
intent, because the interpretation advanced the statute’s purpose of 
protecting consumers, and because the agency is entitled to deference based 
on its experience in the field. 
Kolev creates a split between the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, both of which have held that the FTC’s proscription on 
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mandatory arbitration of MMWA claims is itself proscribed by the FAA, as 
construed by the Supreme Court. See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 
298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 
1268 (11th Cir. 2002). Relying on McMahon and Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), those courts echoed the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the strong Congressional 
preference for arbitration evidenced by the FAA and held that since the 
MMWA does not indicate an express desire to preclude arbitration, the 
agency may not supply a curb on arbitration. (The Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits were unswayed by the fact that the MMWA was enacted at a time 
when it was widely assumed that rights created by federal statutes were 
simply not arbitrable.) 
The Supreme Court may well decide to take Kolev if review is 
sought. If it does, the “federal policy favoring arbitration” may then carry 
the day. But that won’t be the end of the matter. Unlike the FTC, the NLRB 
and FINRA are active promoters of arbitration. Both agencies are perfectly 
happy to compel arbitration of individual claims, as long as the right to 
proceed by collective action remains available. Where the FTC’s 
interpretation of the MMWA prohibited all pre-dispute, binding arbitration 
agreements as applied to warranty claims, the NLRB and FINRA singled 
out only the class waivers. So even if the Court strikes down the FTC’s rule 
against binding arbitration of individual claims, that ruling will not 
necessarily control with respect to the NLRB and FINRA’s rules 
prohibiting class waivers. 
The Endgame 
The Federal Arbitration Act was not intended to apply to state 
courts, was not intended to apply to claims based on mandatory legal rules, 
and was not intended to apply to most contracts of employment. Those 
points are made unequivocally in the extensive legislative history of the 
Act. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme 
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 
FLA. ST. L. REV. 99 (2006). Until the 1980s, they were widely accepted by 
the judiciary. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1 (1984)(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Since that time, the Supreme Court 
has fabricated a body of arbitration law unmoored from the underlying 
statutory command. The Court’s protestations notwithstanding, the “federal 
policy favoring arbitration” is a creation of the Supreme Court, not 
Congress. 
The NLRB, the SEC/FINRA, and the FTC are regulatory bodies 
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expressly given the authority to make federal law. To overrule their 
interpretations of the statutes they are Congressionally authorized to 
construe and enforce, the Court will have to find that its gloss on a short, 
eighty-five year old procedural rule trumps agency regulations interpreting 
far more comprehensive, substantive statutes enacted years or decades after 
the FAA, at a time when Congress could not have imagined that consumers 
and employees would be forced into arbitration. These cases will thus test 
the Court’s willingness to impose its pro-business and anti-adjudicatory 
vision on the nation over the objections of federal regulators to whom the 
Court has for decades given deference in the interpretation of federal law.  
